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CHAYANOV’S RULE AND SCHOOL REFORM
Alexander Sidorkin
Bowling Green State University
Alexander V. Chayanov was a Russian economist and rural sociologist
killed in Stalin’s purges around 1938. He authored a theory of peasant economy
that was quite influential in Western economic anthropology since translation of
his major work in 1966.1 Marshall Sahlins successfully used his theory in Stone
Age Economicsand introduced ―Chayanov’s rule‖: ―In the community of domestic
producing groups, the greater the relative working capacity of the household the
less its members work.‖2 Peasant societies have certain level of standard
consumption determined by what a family with the lowest worker/consumer ratio
can attain. In other words, a peasant family will work harder if they have many
small children to feed, but when these children grow up and begin to participate
in production, the economic activity of the household will taper off, even though
the opportunity for creating and accumulating more wealth will be unused. There
are intrinsic limits to economic growth that have to do with social and political
pressures of an egalitarian society, but also with what Chayanov calls the
equilibrium between drudgery and utility. The latter is best explained by
Durrenberger and Tannenbaum as ―the balance between what people would like
to have versus the difficulty of the labor entailed in achieving these consumption
goals.‖3 Because peasants exploit their own labor, cutting back on work is
economically more advantageous than receiving benefits from working beyond
the minimum required to sustain a traditional level of consumption.
From the classical economic point of view, such a behavior looks irrational.
Russian and later Soviet officials were frustrated by the peasants’ inability to
participate in intensification of agriculture, required by the country’s rapid
industrialization. Chayanov’s theory was an attempt to look beyond the frustration.
Not unique to Russia, the situation of resistant underdevelopment is common
throughout the Third World countries. It prompted development of economic
anthropology and economic sociology—disciplines that strive to understand the
aberrations, the economic relationships outside of classical economic theory’s
framework. One of the major attractions of Chayanov’s theory, as well as of the
whole field of economic anthropology, is an ability to explain behaviors that
look ―irrational‖ from the point of view of standard economics. I use the spirit of
this approach (but not its letter) to explain why students often do not demonstrate
the expected level of effort. The explanation shows some of the limits of the
contemporary school reforming.
The contemporary school reform is an attempt to intensify the learning
labor of students. The learning labor is defined here as all learning activities
directed by teachers in and out of the school proper, as all things students must
do as students (listening to lectures, completing work sheets, solving problems,
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writing essays, doing homework, etc.). I have provided justifications for such an
interpretation elsewhere;4 for now, let us consider the notion of learning labor to
be a starting point for the following discussion.
Like any other labor, the learning labor can have various levels of
productivity. The same expenditure of effort can bring various levels of

educational results. The traditionalism-progressivism debate is largely a
disagreement on which forms of student labor are more efficient; the question of
how to measure effectiveness is even more important. It becomes more and more
clear that a variety of labor forms, both traditionalist and progressivist, must be
used to ensure the most productive mix. The debate aside, one must note that no
major educational discoveries have been introduced in the last century. The wellknown forms of learning have been improved and augmented by computer-based
technologies, but the productivity of learning labor cannot be raised significantly.
In contrast with rapidly developed technologies of manufacturing, learning still
involves large quantities of frustratingly ineffective drudgery. The reasons for
that are not accidental, and they cannot be overcome by a theoretical breakthrough
of some sort. The limits of learning labor’s productivity are determined by its
very nature. Simply put, if no effort is made, the learning labor is not productive.
The drudgery itself (the effort, the expenditure of strength) is the major productive
component of students’ labor. Two main strategies account for lion’s share of
productivity gains outside of education: division of labor (or in general, effective
organization) and mechanization of work processes. Neither of the two strategies
can easily be used in learning, because they both contradict the purpose of
learning. By necessity, we cannot ask half of the students to learn multiplication,
and the other half – long divisions. We disallow simple copying and pasting
materials from the Internet, because such an exercise does not add any learning
value to students’ schoolwork. Paradoxically, learning is a form of labor that
will always remain ineffective. In this respect, learning is like exercising: no one
can do it for you, and a car ride will not substitute jogging.
The thrust of the school reform efforts of the past 25 years was directed at
making student labor more intensive and more extensive, not more effective. It
is no longer a matter of choosing between more experiential and more traditional
forms of learning, for the methods matter less than most educational scholars are
willing to admit. The federal government for example, rightly got out of the
business of prescribing teaching methods and is content with controlling the
outcomes. The idea is to increase length and intensity of schoolwork and
homework. Therefore, the problem of schooling is that of motivation, not
organization, and not of teaching. The task here is therefore to understand what
motivates students to perform labor demanded of them, and how these factors
can interfere with the task of overall intensification of such labor. Two assumptions
will guide this discussion: (1) The standard economic theories (such as human
capital theory) fail to account for numerous instances of student behavior, and
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should therefore be replaced by economic anthropological frameworks, and (2)
the intensity of learning labor is guided mainly by each individual school’s cultural
and economic properties rather than by large-scale class and race conflicts, as
critical theorists would like us to believe. Both of these assumptions need
systematic explication that will be undertaken outside of this paper. My only
aim is to demonstrate how a certain form of theorizing is plausible, not that it is
accurate.
From an economic point of view, learning labor is a form of taxation, not
unlike those methods widely used in pre-industrial societies. Examples of labor
taxation include mobilization of free labor for building roads, pyramids, the
Great Wall of China, etc. The socialist economies have been using labor taxation
extensively with more or less drastic enforcement measures, but in capitalist
industrial societies, monetary taxation is the norm. One notable exception is the
learning labor of students. The students are asked to perform much work,

ostensibly for their own benefit. Yet the methods of extraction (compulsory
education) and the method of remuneration (social approval, credentials, etc.)
clearly place the learning labor in the category of taxation. In fact, the
contradiction between the stated goals and the forms of organization reveals the
profound ambivalence of schooling. Conventions of economic analysis compel
me to ignore the rhetoric, and concentrate on the objective characteristics of
school labor. From an economic standpoint, learning is a tax collected as
compulsory labor. Like any compulsory labor, it suffers from subtle sabotage of
laborers.
Schools are the institution designed to extract the labor from students.
Like any other form of taxation, the learning labor benefits the society at large.
One important difference is this: other labor taxes deposit value in a concrete
physical object such as a road or bridge or a temple. In the case of learning
labor, the depository of value (skills and knowledge) is the student herself. Hardly
anyone will dispute that the total sum of all skills and knowledge deposited in
individual students and workers is a public good, yet it is a special public good,
stashed away in millions of pieces controlled to a certain extent by individuals.
It is important to remember that the individuals cannot make the value of their
education beneficial to them without entering into the labor market. Education
is a public good that is stored by individuals, yet it can only reveal its true value
in the public sphere. The laborer sells his labor power to the employer, not the
actual value of his labor. Part of the labor power is the skills and knowledge
manufactured by the laborer during his years of unpaid labor as a student. Of
course, teachers have contributed to creation of this value, but the student himself
has contributed the most. The Human Capital Theory assumes that the laborer
receives a fair compensation for his previous work as a student, but very simple
calculations suggest this is not true. 5 If education benefited only students as
individuals, the institution of compulsory education would have never arisen.
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Learning labor also benefits individual students differentially; that is, more
intensive labor must produce greater economic rewards in the future. Working
as hard as one can would be the most obvious choice, and anything else will
appear to be irrational. Faced with the obvious fact that many if not most students
clearly do not work at maximum capacity, educational theorists speculate about
immaturity or the pressure from poor learning conditions or social background
of schooling. Yet all these explanations lack plausibility. Surely, the cognitive
abilities of even first-graders allow to make the perfectly rational choices. Surely,
even in poor schools students could apply much more effort, should they calculate
the benefits of education. Surely, all students understand the self-defeating side
of political resistance. My claim is that a powerful economic and social
mechanisms insures students’ underperformance, a mechanism similar to that
described by Chayanov and Sahlins. Many schools are enclaves of non-capitalist
economies, in which students make rational choices. We need to understand the
rules of their economies, which cannot be done in the space of one paper. The
method used below is that of theoretical case-study. I am not claiming that the
school and its players are typical; I only claim that they are plausible.
Let us now examine the West Side school as a theoretical case. It has
developed the customary rate of labor (CRL), a common understanding of how
much work a student owes to a teacher. The rate is not a matter of individual
preference, but is rather an unspoken social contract. The rate includes not only
the number of written assignments, or the amount of homework, but also, and
more importantly, the ratio of on-task versus off-task time in classroom. The

more goofing around is going on, the less is actual on-task time, and the lower is
the CRL.
The CRL is differentiated according to which subject we are looking at,
and how well a student wants to do in class. For example, a passable grade in
math may not imply the same amount of work as an A in art class. So we are
dealing here with a number of interrelated rates. A sudden increase of the rate in
what has been a traditional less labor-intensive class may have a ripple effect on
the overall average rate. For example, if a music teacher is able to extract five
hours of homework a week, plus 90% on-task time in classroom, this may trigger
an unreasonably high expectations from the Math or English teachers, because
their status demands having higher rates than in music.
The CRL is also differentiated by ability. Everyone is perfectly aware of
differences in individual students’ ability to perform work. The CRL is determined
by how much work a less able but diligent student can perform to achieve a high
grade in the class. The higher ability students will reduce their own labor
expenditures to maintain the CRL, even if that means they are not operating at
full capacity.

Page 5
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES IN EDUCATION – 2005/Volume 36
71
Any attempts to increase the CRL, for example, by a new teacher, will be
met with active or passive resistance by both students and other teachers. The
arsenal of methods is wide and flexible: from refusal to do homework to
disciplinary disruptions, from signs of disrespect to administrative pressures.
But students are also discouraging each other from upgrading their effort. The
mechanism is quite simple here: each individual contribution of labor is a part of
collective contribution to keep teachers relatively happy and grades relatively
high. So it is commonly expected that everyone will contribute something.
Everyone has a stake at maintaining the CRL. Below is a sample of school
members and their basic strategies with respect to the customary labor rate.
1. Meet Joe, a popular and successful science teacher. Like a
Melanesian Big Man, he has achieved a high social status by a
skillful use of generosity in the context of reciprocity. He has
bestowed a number of favors, gifts, and privileges on many students
and some teachers. He visibly spends more time on preparing
entertaining lessons than anyone else, thus reducing the drudgery
factor for students. He helps with advice, lends an attentive ear,
cares about students’ personal lives, gets them out of trouble, and
negotiates conflicts. Joe applies for grants, and brings additional
resources to the science department. He has a number of student
followers involved in the science club, whose successes were
covered in a local paper. These and other activities have gradually
created a sense of obligation, converted to generalized high regard.
Students do not remember any more what specific favor each of
them received from Joe; rather, they perceive his status in a holistic
manner; Joe is someone to be respected. The student contribution
of labor in his classes is the highest in the entire school; it is more
than just a generic labor tax, but takes a meaning of personal tribute
to Joe. Sahlins has demonstrated how Big Man figures can generate
additional labor beyond what is expected by the Chayanov’s rule.
This is an example of economic power of purely political
mobilization of resources.6 The higher rates of labor allow Joe look
good in the school principal’s eyes, because of the higher tests scores
he is able to produce. Consequently, he has more influence on the

school administration, and can help many students, which in turn,
upholds his status as an influential teacher. What has begun as
reciprocity relation is transforming into the redistribution: students
contribute to Joe’s power, while he is obliged to redistribute
generously the power he accumulates. Joe is not interested in upping
the average CRL, because that would make his specially negotiated
higher rate more difficult to maintain, and will therefore degrade
his status among other teachers and among students.
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2. Sara is an unpopular Social Studies teacher in her third year at
the school. Students contribute the amount of labor that is minimally
necessary to avoid open conflict with the school principal. This is
not because of lack of skills, but because the students have to reduce
their labor expenditures somewhere. Her classes are very often
disrupted, so that students are entertained rather than working, thus
greatly reducing the drudgery component. Almost no one does
homework. Sara cannot fail entire classes, because this will poorly
reflect on her teaching reputation; nor can she seek help in classroom
management, because it will further add to her reputation as a poor
disciplinarian. The only way of peaceful coexistence is to collect
labor at much reduced rates, while giving a grade distribution that
looks normal. To justify the normal grade curve, she has to expect
some work to be done for a grade, but it is ridiculously easy to
make a grade in her class. She would like to raise the CLR for her
own class, but has no stake in raising the average for the whole
school. While teachers like Joe are overtly supportive of Sara, they
are not about to risk their own status to rescue a fellow teacher;
rather, they prefer to lament the lack of training and experience she
exhibits. The other teachers understand that they are able to collect
higher shares of student labor in part because Sara can collect very
little.
3. Our next character is Steve, the troublemaker student. He
performs an important task of diluting labor intensity on behalf of
the entire student body. Steve creates an occasional classroom
disruption thus testing the limits of labor reduction. He is the
bargaining representative for other students as well as a part-time
entertainer. Only because of his efforts, the flexible boundary of
acceptable labor minimum made visible. Steve is like a blacksmith
or a potter in rural societies who is freed from regular labor, because
he performs a specialized sort of work. Steve’s contribution involves
personal risk, and high stress levels. However, his rationale is similar
to that of Joe and other Big Men: contributing generously to the
common good will pay off in form of higher social status. He is not
competing for teachers’ recognition, yet his status among students
is relatively high and is boosted by the reputation of a fearless
outlaw.
4. And finally, Sally the good student. She is a very disciplined,
hard-working student— not among the class geniuses, but knows
how to make an A in any class. Her performance is the gold standard
for determining the CRL. She firmly believes that she must be able
to make an A in every class with a reasonable effort. She is the
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chief enforcer of the rate, for if an assignment appears to be too
difficult, or amount of work too great to handle, she directly
challenges the offending teacher. She is a fierce enforcer of the
CRL. Sally is able to negotiate the political system of the school, in
part because of her mother who is active in the building’s PTA, and
is otherwise connected. Sally also has a busy social life and is
striving to maintain high status both among teachers and students.
Any increase of the general CRL will put her in jeopardy, because
she would then be forced to scale down her social life or suffer a
drop in GPA.
The Westside School as a whole will unlikely be responsive to the demands
of school reform. While a new principal may try to turn up the enthusiasm for
learning, and introduce a few extra sessions of test preparation, she is unlikely to
increase the CRL, simply because no constituency at or around school is interested
in doing so. The school is one of many variations of school economies. Some of
them are based on different principles, and may allow for free competition among
students, and involve no customary rate of labor. In others, students have no
sense of solidarity to support the CRL, because they pursue different economic
aims. A failing school is probably a failing economy, which does not follow any
particular pattern of labor. However, in most cases, learning labor as an essentially
individual activity must be regulated by relationships among students and teachers.
It is very difficult to imagine an ideal school where a student is free to exercise
her abilities at maximum extent, and a teacher is allowed to challenge those
abilities to the fullest. People who are in a daily contact naturally find a way of
coordinating their efforts. The relational economies come to play where the
capitalist, market-based economy cannot effectively penetrate.
The cast of characters above demonstrates that any school reform is not
an easy task. In the present form, the reform is unsustainable, because it ignores
the relational economies of schooling. No intensification of learning labor can
occur without dealing with these relational economies. School reform must be
viewed more in terms of economic development in the third world countries.
Direct imposition of market principles is impossible on pre-capitalistic societies;
similarly, the arbitrary increase of learning labor cannot happen because of the
economic logic embedded in school communities. In trying to raise the CRL in
the Westside School, one would be well advised to take the relational economy
into consideration. For example, Joe must be persuaded to share his influence
with Sara and other teachers, so they are treated like a cast rather than individual
big men, competing for the same limited allocation of status. The job of parttime entertainer must be taken away from Steve; which means that teachers and
administrators must provide both the portions of entertainment and breaking up
the routine of the school day. Yet this means that Steve must be given another
job, for example of a school newspaper’s reporter, or a student government
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member. Sally must accept lower GPA, which means that other more able students
should be able to enjoy higher social status. Each of these propositions seems
formidable, and yet ignoring them would not be wise.
The most important shift must occur in the ideology of schooling. The
school must develop a form of locally-acceptable ideology somehow legitimizing

the increase in learning labor input in terms of the communal good, not individual
achievement. Continuing attempts to ―sell‖ education as a service to students
are outdated and do not reflect the nature of mass schooling. Schooling must be
recast in terms of national service. Going to schools is something young people
should do as an obligation, as a duty. The rhetoric of service has an established,
well-developed vocabulary of service sacrifice and common good. Such a rhetoric
may allow further mobilization of student effort through activation of relational
mechanism within each schools. Students will work more for a society that is
thankful and is taking care of their own social needs. School effectiveness should
be therefore measured not only—and not as much by—learning outcomes, but
also by the quality of the process of school life. Without providing too much
detail, I can only point out that such indicators are possible. It is enough to point
out to the instruments developed by the World Bank to measure levels of the
social capital in a given society.7
The current school reform movement comes from very reasonable
expectations of accountability; yet it is flawed in its understanding of both quality
control procedures (from which it originally was drawn) and the nature of
schooling. The accountability practices should not be abandoned, but must be
changed so that schools are accountable for the conditions of student work. For
example, hospitals report not only on the recovery rate of their patients, but also
on patient satisfaction, safety, quality of food, community relations, etc. Generally,
in most quality management systems such as ISO 9000, control over the process
of production takes precedence over the immediate bottom line accountability.
In education, we should adopt similar practices. Each school’s authorities must
come up with a large list of services students would want, and make sure the
teachers regulate access to those services. For example, a thicker network of
after-school activities with voluntary participation will create some of these
resources. School report cards will then include not only test results, but also the
level of social capital built in schools.
Relational economies of schooling are not just social inertia opposing
social change. Quite to the contrary, students and teachers in many schools need
and want change. Yet such change cannot be brought through purely
administrative, authoritarian methods advocated by both Democratic and
Republican administrations. What needs to be done is a much more sophisticated
socio-economic analysis of schooling beyond narratives of accountability and
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class struggle. If we hope to change schools, we need to understand and change
the relational, non-capitalist economies that govern those schools.
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